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Time Management and the Military Decision Making Process

A Monograph
by

Major Harry D. Scott Jr.
Infantry



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ABSTRACT

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MAJ Harry D. Scott Jr., USA, 67 pages.

This monograph analyzes the military decision making process in terms of time management in order to determine if a timeline will expedite the process. The monograph begins by establishing the importance of time and time management in planning. This section provides a general discussion of time, an explanation of the Army's 1/3 - 2/3 rule, and a synopsis of the deficiencies and recommendations for improvement of units' execution of the military decision making process during rotations to the National Training Centers. Next an analysis is made of how the US Army's current publications address time. The documents reviewed include FM 100-5, FM 101-5, FC 71-6, FC 101-55, FC 71-100, FM 71-100, and ST 100-9. The purpose of the next section is to examine how the British, Germans, and Russians manage time as part of their military decision making process. Finally a timeline for the brigade military decision making process is proposed as a technique to manage time. This timeline has been undergoing field testing since 1988 and has been reviewed by numerous agencies and individuals.

The monograph concludes with the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing a timeline. The end result is that the advantages of a timeline far outweigh the disadvantages. Over 70% of the rotations to the National Training Centers in Fort Irwin, California and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas fail to manage time. A technique must be developed to assist the units in accomplishing their missions in a timely manner. Perhaps using some of the techniques that other armies use will facilitate time management. The timeline presented for the combat arms brigade military decision making process is a technique that worked for one brigade, but as a minimum it can be used a base to design unit specific timelines, and possible applications at battalion and division.


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
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INTRODUCTION

Time, and the saving of it, must be the soul of every order.¹

Time management is the efficient and effective use of time. One method to manage time at brigade is to use a timeline. A timeline contains key events that require actions in the time allotted.

In an army of growing technology, the information available for planning has grown substantially, but time has remained constant. The battle of time management is lost by over 70% of the brigades rotating through the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center.² In an attempt to solve this problem, this monograph will address time and time management by answering the question: Will a timeline expedite the brigade military decision making process?

To answer this question, I will examine five areas: the importance of time and time management in the military decision making process, time as expressed in the current United States Army (USA) publications, time management by other armies, introduction of a field tested timeline, and the conclusions.

The first area, to establish the relevance of time and time management in the military decision making process, examines the army's time standard, the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. The 1/3 - 2/3 rule means that the commander and staff should use a maximum of one third of the available time

(time is calculated from the receipt of the higher headquarters order at the planning headquarters, to the time when the subordinate unit starts movement) to plan, prepare, and issue an order and allocate a minimum of two thirds of the time for the commanders and leaders of subordinate units. A summary of the deficiencies, related to time and time management, are noted in several years of rotations to the National Training Centers.

The second area is a review of how time is expressed in United States Army publications. The publications include Army field manuals, Army field circulars, and student texts from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The review of the publications highlights how the literature emphasizes the importance of the management of time. It also notes the absence of any specific guidance in providing a timeline or a method of incorporating the steps of decision making via a time schedule.

The management of time by the British, Germans, and Russian armies is analyzed in the third section. The goal is to see if these established armies have found a mechanism to manage time and how it is incorporated into the planning sequence.

The fourth section provides an example of a brigade twelve hour planning timeline. The intent of the timeline is to provide a systematic and standard way of conducting the military decision making process by incorporating the

key or critical events necessary in planning on a timeline.

The final area is conclusions and implications. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using a timeline and serves as a summary of the previous areas. In answering the monograph question, reference the timeline expediting the military decision making process, each section is weighted.

THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME AND TIME MANAGEMENT

Time that passes is lost to the aggressor. Time lost is always a disadvantage that is bound in some way to weaken he who loses it.³

Throughout history, there are various examples that support why one of the most important elements in war is time. At the battle of Gettysburg, it was a race between General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and General Meade's Army of the Potomac to occupy Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top. Bull Run, Waterloo, and Austerlitz were victories by the generals who provided timely⁴ reinforcements on the battlefield.

Because of time's commonality to both opposing decision makers it is essential to get inside the enemy's decision making process and gain a time advantage. To facilitate this process the Army has established the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Coordinating Draft), Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College Student Text (ST) 100-9, The Command Estimate Process, Army Field

Circular (FC) 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Control, and Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 71-3-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Heavy Brigade Command Group and Staff, reference the importance of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. The Army has established the 1/3 - 2/3 rule as a task standard to meet in the development of an operations order.

The goal of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule is to plan, prepare, and execute orders quicker than the opposing force in order to gain an advantage in time. With more time available to the subordinate leaders, better preparation for combat in terms of reconnaissance and rehearsals can be accomplished.

The 1/3 - 2/3 rule is one of the measures of time management that is evaluated at the National Training Centers. Based on thirty six rotations from September 1986 to May 1990, at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, between 50-75% of the brigade staffs⁵ were deficient in effective time management. Based on twenty four rotations, from October 1988 to July 1992, to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 70% of the units were ineffective in allocating⁶ 2/3s of the time available to the subordinate units.

The reasons for this abuse of time management in the military decision making process are noteworthy. In several cases, "the brigade executive officer (XO) left the role of integrating the staff to the brigade operations and training officer (S3). The XO's failure to assume this

role led to ineffective time management during the orders process." ⁷ In some staffs, a written planning timeline was not used and members of the orders group were several hours late to meetings. Without adequate time management and a planning timeline, staffs were unable to work efficiently and implement a sleep plan. Several staffs and commanders failed to meet at the same time resulting in a plan that was uncoordinated. ⁸ The most common violation was the failure to develop a timeline applying the 1/3 - 2/3 rule.

Another common criticism during JRTC rotations was the following statements.

The appropriate allocation of time during the low intensity conflict planning process was not adhered to resulting in subordinate units having minimal time to prepare. Time management is critical during both the planning process and the execution of an operation. Schedules must be set and subordinates must adhere to them short of major changes in the brigade battle. ⁹

In a detailed study of JRTC rotations from 1987 to 1989, 80% of the units struggled with troop leading procedures and in every case inadequate time management was a critical factor. ¹⁰ Seventy per cent of the units violated the 1/3 - 2/3 rule and 75% of the units experienced problems in rigidly enforcing the 1/3 - 2/3 rule throughout the chain of command. ¹¹

Several rotations failed to efficiently use time, and when time schedules were developed, the staff failed to implement them. Commanders had difficulty in developing

tentative plans and time schedules. Some timelines were vague and did not include all the critical events. The decision making processes were disjointed and failed to coordinate staff action. Other timelines failed to allocate adequate time for course of action (COA) development, wargaming and orders preparation.¹²

These failures at brigade contributed to 90% of the battalions failing to establish a timeline or creating an unrealistic timeline.¹³ A popular recommendation in the take home packages was to "publish a more realistic key event time schedule for all operations. Ensure there is sufficient time for COA development, wargaming, and the preparation of the orders. Once published, make all personnel adhere to this timeline."¹⁴

Some additional recommendations to improve time management suggest that "the brigade should always develop a planning time line as the first step to help the staff manage their time and let the commander know when he needs to be available."¹⁵ "The staff could save time if they developed a planning time line upon order receipt."¹⁶ It was also recommended that staffs practice the military decision making process and develop command and control standard operating procedures (C2 SOPs). The C2 SOP should be written to include specific directed work tasks, formats, and timelines directing assessments, inputs and staff coordination.¹⁷

TIME AS EXPRESSED IN THE CURRENT UNITED STATES ARMY
PUBLICATIONS

It is important to review the current United States Army doctrinal and academic literature in order to gain a better understanding of why a majority of units have problems in managing time. Time is mentioned in most of the doctrine but unfortunately only minimum guidance is provided reference its use in the military decision making process. There are no field manuals, field circulars, or training circulars that offer detailed techniques or procedures in the use of time.

The purpose of this section is to provide a review of current publications with respect to time. An analysis is made of FM 100-5, FM 101-5, FC 71-6, FC 101-55, FC 71-100, FM 71-100, FM 100-15, and ST 100-9.

The keystone doctrinal manual of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Preliminary Draft), suggests that the commander is responsible for time management. The importance of managing time in establishing conditions for decisive operations is stressed in the defense and the delay. The criticality of providing subordinates ample time to plan and prepare for their operations is emphasized twice in this manual. However, the only guidance provided to the commander is to carefully budget available time and instill discipline in oneself and their battle staffs.

Draft manual, FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Coordinating Draft), emphasizes the

significance of time management throughout the chapter on the military decision making process. In a section titled the time plan, emphasis is placed on not wasting time, the importance of the commander analyzing the time available, and some of the factors that need to be considered in planning the use of time. ²⁰ The most beneficial part of the manual is a discussion on time management and the introduction of three new tactical estimate procedures. These procedures are based on the availability of time and staff proficiency and the percentage of available planning time for the command estimate, abbreviated command estimate, and troop leading procedures. Appendix A contains the details of the tactical estimate procedures and Appendix B provides the percentage of available planning time for command estimates, abbreviated command estimates, and troop leading procedures. This is the only manual that takes time and provides a limited guide for its use in the military decision making process.

The third manual reviewed, FC 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Control, stresses time in terms of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule and available time. The section on available time encourages the commander to use reverse planning to determine the amount of time necessary to plan. The importance of the amount of time available for the planning process and preparation for the mission is mentioned, but no suggestions on how to budget that time are provided. ²⁰

The next higher echelons for command and control, division and corps, provide only a paragraph on time in FC 101-55, Corps and Division Command and Control. Time is presented as an enemy to planning. The three suggestions provided to expedite planning and save time are using detailed standard operating procedures (SOPs), implementing concurrent planning, and communicating among²¹ the staff.

Three manuals, FC 71-100, Armored and Mechanized Division and Brigade Operations, FM 71-100, Division Operations, and FM 100-15, Corps Operations, barely mention time. FC 71-100 only mentions time in terms of getting orders out on time and highlighting the 1/3 - 2/3²² rule. FM 71-100 also emphasizes timely orders and providing a majority of the time to subordinates for their²³ planning and preparation. The 1/3 - 2/3 rule is also mentioned in FM 100-15, but the only other reference to time, is as a governing factor that may dictate the²⁴ planning and execution phases.

From 1986 to 1992, the Command and General Staff College has published ST 100-9, The Command Estimate Process. This student text is not doctrine, but offers a description of the tactical decision making process, and offers examples of how to implement the doctrine found in FM 101-5. In the chapter on mission analysis, the section on time analysis, addresses determining time available, knowing the decision cycle, and allocating time. This

publication refers to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule and planning an operation using a minimum amount of time. Several techniques; using warning orders, making assumptions to fill information voids, issuing detailed commander's guidance, and promoting parallel planning, are provided as measures to maximize planning time. Unfortunately, no technique is provided to allocate time during the military decision making process.

TIME MANAGEMENT BY OTHER ARMIES

According to the Soviet High Command, the ideal Soviet commander must follow the conviction that "any time lost that could have been saved is a gift, made to the enemy, that he will use against us; any time saved is a resource of which we deprive the enemy, in his defense against us or in his attack upon us." ²⁵

It is important to analyze how other armies conduct time management in the military decision making process. Perhaps some ideas on time management can be learned from other countries. The purpose of this section is to examine how the British, Germans, and Russians manage time as part of their military decision making process.

In June 1992, the British Headquarters of Doctrine and Training in the Ministry of Defence published the final draft on command and control. Two pertinent items on time are provided; several paragraphs on the importance of time in planning and an appendix on the command estimate. With

the British adoption of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule in 1990 as a general guide, commanders are instructed to allocate sufficient time for their subordinates to plan. In²⁶ interests of time, the commander must develop a good and flexible plan, not a perfect one. As more time and²⁷ information becomes available the plan can be adjusted.

The second pertinent item, the command estimate, is a revised means of quickly implementating decision making in combat under time constraints. Time is managed by providing a percentage of time to be spent on each portion of the command estimate. The three stage process is mission analysis, factors, and consideration and decision. Mission analysis is allocated 20% of the available time, factors is permitted 50% of the available time, and²⁸ consideration and decision is given 30% of the available time. Appendix C provides the details of the British command estimate. More emphasis is placed on using time to²⁹ rehearse versus formal wargaming during this process.

Similar to the British, the Germans rely a great deal on the commander to reduce planning time by conducting his own estimate of the situation. The German army places substantial trust and confidence in their leader's judgements. During World War II German division commanders executed their entire military decision making process in³⁰ two hours. This could be achieved by limiting the number of decision makers involved in the process to the commander, deputy, or chief of staff and having a highly

trained and efficient staff.³¹ Currently, the commander uses five steps in the estimate of the situation; analysis of the mission, estimate of the friendly and enemy situation, evaluation of environmental conditions, formulation of own courses of action, and comparison of each course of action.³² The results of the estimate are given to the staff to publish the executive order.

German leaders are instructed to plan every operation focusing on the balance of forces, time, and space available.³³ The goal is to gain a decisive advantage by planning all actions in accordance with the time available. Available time is calculated by determining the amount of time between the execution of the operation and the start of planning. Whenever possible, methods should be employed to reduce planning and execution time, "especially by making contingency logistic and medical arrangements, by timely planning, and establishing communication links, as well as by issuing warning orders to prepare units for their missions."³⁴

The Russians also emphasize time management. Their entire control structure is designed to plan and execute operations which deny any adversary a time advantage. Time is included in the calculation of force ratios as a 2:1 advantage for the army which has the time advantage. The Russians continue to reduce the amount of time needed to plan an operation.³⁵ They have improved from one to three days in preparation for a battalion deliberate attack

36
during World War II to 8-12 hours in 1980 to 4 hours in
37
1990.

The Russians have reduced the time it takes to execute the military decision making process. This is accomplished by providing extensive training to the commander and staff at all levels, increasing the centralization of control by having leaders involved in all aspects of the control system, and using automated control systems. They have also standardized procedures, methodology, and reporting formats and implemented time-dependent networking

38
methods. They maximized the use of graphics and order battle drills, and minimized the verbage in their orders
39
to save time. Performing as many tasks as possible after receipt of the warning order and adhering to stringent time norms in the execution of the decision making process contributed to shortening the use of time.

The stringent time norms are a means to reduce the time required by a commander to effectively make decisions. The Russians have three types of decision making, three types of planning methods, and some unique concepts of time required for preparation of combat operations. The three types of decision making are decision by elements of the situation, decision by elements of the decision, and decision by command. The fastest method, decision by command, is a quick decision made by the commander after his assessment. The decision by elements of the decision is made by the commander after

looking at several likely situational factors. The decision method used when time is not a major consideration is decision by elements of the situation. In this method each situational factor is analyzed and all alternatives
40
are considered.

The three types of planning methods employed by Russian officers are linked to the time available. The sequential method, requiring the most time, involves completing the entire plan at each echelon before issuing it to the next subordinate commander. The parallel method, a faster planning technique, has several echelons of staff working concurrently on the plan. The executive method, the fastest planning technique, requires the commander to provide an order directly to the unit involved with minimal
41
staff preparation.

The three planning methods and types of decision making are similar to US techniques, but the major differences are the Russian's unique concepts for calculating time required for preparation of combat orders, the time segment analysis, the use of nomograms, and the time-dependent networking methods.

The first major difference between Russian and US decision making techniques is the calculation of time required for preparation of combat orders.

The procedure for calculating the time usually amounts to the following. First, the total amount of time available for organization of combat is specified, with breakdown into daytime and nighttime. Then a list is made of the main jobs to be performed,

with an approximate estimate of the times required. Simultaneously, the operations which can be performed in parallel or at the very same time are noted; the time frames determined by the order of the superior are noted; the operations to be performed at night (in the dark) are grouped. Then the time frames for implementing all the basic measures are specified. The results of this work are usually reflected in a time table plan of combat preparation. 42

The second major difference is the use of the time segment analysis. The Russian control and implementation time ($T\text{-control} + T\text{-action}$) must always be less than the time required by enemy forces to implement their plan ($T\text{-critical}$). The control time ($T\text{-control}$) is the summation of the time required for information processing and transmission to the commander, plus the time for staff work and commander's decision, plus the time it takes to disseminate the plan to the subordinates. The control time is added to the time it takes for detailed planning and mission execution ($T\text{-action}$). The Russians will always adjust their timeline to be less than their opposition in order to maintain the initiative. 43

The third difference is that Russian commanders were mandated to use nomograms, which are charts and tables that provide the time norm capabilities of friendly and enemy units. These charts, based on data from World War II and various exercises, assist the commander and staff by providing a rapid means of conducting mission analysis and ensures the mission will be accomplished in less than critical time. Once a commander analyzes the current situation he selects the appropriate nomogram which has the

time required to execute combat and control operations. 44

The fourth major difference between Russian and US decision making techniques is the use of the time-dependent networking method. The Russian network chart is similar to the US Program Evaluation Review Techniques (PERT) or Critical Path Methods (CPM). The network chart consists of operation codes and the duration of each operation in minutes. By using the network chart the chief of staff can determine the total time required to plan the operation, prescribe the sequence of actions to be taken, distribute the various tasks among the staff, and calculate time reserves by reducing or concurrently executing several paths. 45

BRIGADE 12 HOUR PLANNING TIMELINE

In most decision making organizations, and especially in military organizations supported by command, control, and communications systems, timeliness is of critical importance. The ability of an organization to perform the tasks and transmit information in a timely manner is indeed a determinant factor of effectiveness. 46

The purpose of this section is to provide a timeline for the execution of a combat arms brigade military decision making process. The methodology will consist of explaining what the timeline is, how it was developed and tested, and a detailed explanation of the composition of the timeline.

The brigade twelve hour planning timeline (Appendix D) is a technique to minimize planning time, while maintaining

staff efficiency and synchronization. It provides a guide for each member of the brigade staff and all attachments in terms of time management and the required planning products. The goal of this particular timeline is to have a formal written operations order and brief completed in twelve hours. The 1/3 - 2/3 rule dictates the time available. If more time is available, the timeline can be expanded beyond twelve hours. If less time is available, then a six hour timeline that compresses mission analysis, course of action development, and wargaming is feasible.

The proposed timeline was initiated in February 1987, while the author served as a battalion operations and training officer (S3). After one month, as an S3 it became obvious that some type of formal detailed timeline was required to organize the staff and input from the commander as well as structuring the time available to plan. The timeline was updated and evaluated in operations conducted in Korea, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia, a battalion external evaluation, several emergency deployment readiness exercises, and numerous field training exercises (FTXs). In March 1990, my position changed to a brigade S3 and my battalion timeline was expanded to a brigade timeline. The timeline was subjected to operations conducted in the Philippines, several brigade FTXs and a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center. Finally feedback was obtained from the Tactical Commanders Development Course, the Combined Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth,

current and former brigade commanders, battalion commanders, and S3s, and members of the School of Advanced Military Studies. Favorable comments were also provided by the Army Research Institute and the Battle Command Training Program. The revisions include their comments, modifications based on FM 101-5, ST 100-9, and several unpublished manuscripts.

The following timeline is the result of almost five years of research and testing. Each section will be discussed by time segments. The actual timeline (in all capital letters) is provided first, followed by a detailed explanation.

Notification (N) Hour (HR) (N-1 HR)

BRIGADE MAIN COMMAND POST (MAIN CP) NOTIFY ALL MEMBERS OF ORDERS GROUP OF UPCOMING OPERATION: ORDERS GROUP INCLUDES INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (S2), OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER (S3), FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (FSO), FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING OFFICER (FSCORD), BRIGADE EXECUTIVE OFFICER (BDE XO), BRIGADE SIGNAL OFFICER (BSO), AIR LIAISON OFFICER (ALO), ENGINEER LIAISON OFFICER (ENG), AIR DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICER (ADA), MILITARY INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER (MI), MILITARY POLICE LIAISON (MP), FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER (FSB CDR), LOGISTICS OFFICER (S4), PERSONNEL OFFICER (S1), AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER (AVN LNO), CHEMICAL OFFICER (CHEMO), CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA), PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFICER (PSYOPS), ASSISTANT BRIGADE S3 (S3 PLANS), OTHER ATTACHMENTS

PREPARE PLANNING AREA (TWO BLANK BUTCHER BLOCK PAPERS ON EASELS, MARKERS AVAILABLE, CUT PLASTIC FOR OVERLAYS, SAME SCALE MAPS POSTED, BLANK WARNING ORDERS (WO), BLANK REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (RFIs), BLANK OPERATIONS ORDER (OPORDER), BLANK FRAGMENTARY ORDER (FRAGO), BOARDS FOR: SPECIFIED TASKS, IMPLIED TASKS, ESSENTIAL TASKS, PLANNING FACTORS, MISSION, COMMANDER'S INTENT, COURSE OF ACTION, AND BRIEFING SEQUENCE, CHECK ALL EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR PLANNING SEQUENCE INCLUDING COMPUTERS, COPY MACHINE, AND PAPER) S3 PLANS SECTION

EACH MEMBER OF ORDERS GROUP PREPARES INDIVIDUAL WORK AREA, INCORPORATES NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS INTO ORDERS

PROCESS, SHOULD HAVE STANDARDIZED ESTIMATE BOOK/FORMAL, COLLECT AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THE FRIENDLY STATUS, AND BE FAMILIAR WITH ENEMY COUNTERPART'S SYSTEMS

N HR

RECEIVE MISSION (OPORDER, FRAGO, VERBAL ORDER OF COMMANDING OFFICER (VOCO)) AT DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
BRIGADE COMMANDER (BDE CDR), S2, S3, FSO

THE REMAINDER OF ORDERS GROUP ALERTED BY S3 PLANS WHEN TO ASSEMBLE IN MAIN CP, BDE XO, BSO, ALO, ENG, ADA, MI, MP, FSB CDR, S4, S1, AVN LNO, CHEMA, CA, PSYOPS, S3 PLANS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS

N HR + TED

BDE CDR BACK BRIEFS DIVISION COMMANDER (DIV CDR) REFERENCE BRIGADE'S MISSION, MAJOR TASKS, AND UNDERSTANDING OF DIV CDR'S INTENT

BDE CDR CONDUCTS INITIAL MISSION ANALYSIS AND FORMULATES INITIAL COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE WHILE RETURNING TO THE MAIN CP

N hour is the time of alert notification for an order to be given at division headquarters. Upon notification (N) of an upcoming order, the brigade main command post (main CP) alerts all the members of the orders group that the brigade commander is enroute to division headquarters. Normally accompanying the brigade commander are the S3, S2, and FSO. While the brigade commander is receiving the division operations order at division headquarters, the remainder of the orders group starts assembling at the main CP and prepares their respective planning areas. Charts or briefing boards greatly assist in briefing the brigade commander at S+1 hour 45 minutes (S hour is the time that planning for an operation begins) and save time by presenting a visual display of information versus a total oral presentation. The S3 plans section, created within

the S3 section, should inventory and check all equipment and material needed for the planning sequence.

The orders group(-) assembles in the main CP and continues with any planning based on information provided in the warning order from division or as a result of parallel planning with the division staff. Key items such as limitations, constraints, available assets, and planning factors can be placed on charts. The brigade commander should be prepared to back brief the division commander after the division order, and while returning to the main CP may want to provide an initial warning order to the subordinate units. The main CP should be alerted of the BDE CDR's estimated time of arrival to the main CP.

S HR

BDE CDR, S3, S2, FSO ARRIVE AT MAIN CP

ORDERS GROUP ASSEMBLES IN MAIN CP

S3 PLANS SECTION NUMBERS SEQUENTIALLY EACH PAGE OF THE 'MASTER' ORDER INCLUDING ANNEXES

DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF ORDERS DIVISION PROVIDES AND AVAILABILITY OF A COPY MACHINE, A MINIMUM OF 6 COPIES OF MAIN BODY OF ORDER ARE NEEDED (S3 PLANS SECTION)
1-BDE CDR, 1-BDE XO, 1-BDE S3/S2/FSO, 1-S3 PLANS,
1-S4/S1/BSO, 1-REMAINDER OF ORDERS GROUP

DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF MANEUVER OVERLAYS DIVISION PROVIDES, A MINIMUM OF 4 COPIES ARE NEEDED (S3 PLANS SECTION) 1-BDE CDR, 1-BDE S3, 1-S3 PLANS, 1-MASTER USED BY ORDERS GROUP TO MAKE ADDITIONAL COPIES

ANNEXES PASSED TO APPROPRIATE STAFF OFFICERS (S3 PLANS SECTION)

ORDERS GROUP READS ORDER

S hour is the actual time that the brigade commander arrives at the main CP, with the operations order and

overlay, and planning starts. Depending on the number of copies provided by division, and the availability of copying facilities, additional copies of the main body should be made. The distribution of the operations orders, annexes, and overlays is the responsibility of the S3 plans officer. The original copy of the order and overlays will be under the control of the S3 plans officer.

EACH MEMBER OF ORDERS GROUP CONDUCTS INITIAL MISSION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFIES FACTS, ASSUMPTIONS, DETERMINES LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE OPERATION, SPECIFIED TASKS, ESSENTIAL TASKS, IMPLIED TASKS, RFIs, ISSUES (SHORTFALLS AND WARSTOPPERS), AVAILABLE ASSETS, PLANNING FACTORS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. LIST THESE ON RESPECTIVE CHARTS TO BE BRIEFED TO BDE CDR AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

Each member of the orders group looks for all the items required for mission analysis while reading the order. This includes reading the main body of the order, pertinent annexes, and close examination of any overlays. The most significant assumptions, tasks, and issues should be noted. All the staff officers should provide a recommendation to the commander for all limitations, constraints, shortfalls, and warstoppers identified.

S3: IDENTIFY TASK & PURPOSE, INTENT, AND DECEPTION PLAN OR DECEPTION OPERATIONS OF TWO LEVELS UP (DIVISION AND CORPS), ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK, AND BRIGADE'S ROLE WITH MAIN EFFORT, PROJECTED TASK ORGANIZATION (CHANGES IN ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS), CURRENT TASK ORGANIZATION (TWO LEVELS DOWN), CURRENT UNIT STATUS [UNIT LOCATIONS, UNIT COMBAT CAPABILITIES (TRAINING STATUS, EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL), UNIT ACTIVITY]], BE FAMILIAR WITH THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, CALCULATE AVAILABLE TIME AND TIME REQUIRED: BASED ON REVERSE PLANNING OF OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED, PRESENT LOCATION, AND DISTANCE FROM THE AREA OF OPERATION. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BDE CDR AND BDE XO AS PART OF THE MISSION ANALYSIS. IDENTIFY AREA OF OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE TO S2 AND DETERMINE AREA OF INTEREST WITH S2

S2 SECTION: DISPLAY CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION. PROVIDE MOST COMPLETE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) AVAILABLE INCLUDING INITIAL BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION: (AREA OF OPERATION AND AREA OF INTEREST), TERRAIN ANALYSIS: (IDENTIFY GAPS IN TERRAIN DATA, DEVELOP TERRAIN FACTORS OVERLAY, INTEGRATE WEATHER, DEVELOP COMBINED OBSTACLES OVERLAY (COO), IDENTIFY TARGETS IN DEEP OPERATIONS AREA, IDENTIFY ADEQUACY OF MANEUVER SPACE IN TERMS OF COMPANY SIZE MOBILITY CORRIDORS AND BATTALION AVENUES OF APPROACH FOR CLOSE OPERATIONS, IDENTIFY TARGETS IN REAR OPERATIONS AREA, AND ANALYZE EACH ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION IN TERMS OF OBSERVATION AND FIRE, COVER AND CONCEALMENT, OBSTACLES, KEY AND DECISIVE TERRAIN, EASE OF MOVEMENT IN TERMS OF GO, SLOW-GO, AND NO-GO TERRAIN, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR CHEMICAL DENIAL, USE OF COMBAT SURVEILLANCE DEVICES, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC. AND THE BEST AVENUE OF APPROACH), WEATHER ANALYSIS: LIGHT DATA (BEFORE MORNING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT, SUNRISE, SUNSET, END OF EVENING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT, MOONRISE, MOONSET, % ILLUMINATION), TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, PRECIPITATION, WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION, CLOUD COVER, VISIBILITY BY ALTITUDE, FORECAST, AFFECTS ON: VISUAL RECON, PHOTO RECON, CHEMICAL/NUCLEAR USE, MOBILITY, SOLDIER AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE, THREAT EVALUATION: DEVELOP THREAT DATA BASE SOURCES (ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK, PUBLICATIONS), EVALUATE THREAT CAPABILITIES [ENEMY'S COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION, TACTICAL DOCTRINE, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, TRAINING), CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY VEHICLES, HOW HE MAKES USE OF ELECTRONIC COMBAT, ARTILLERY, NUCLEAR - BIOLOGICAL - CHEMICAL, ATTACK HELICOPTERS, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, CONVERT ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE INTO GRAPHIC FORM (DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE), IDENTIFY INITIAL HIGH VALUE TARGETS, WEAPON RANGES ARCS, AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY), AND INITIAL THREAT INTEGRATION: DEVELOP INITIAL SITUATIONAL TEMPLATE ON MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION (COA) AND MOST DANGEROUS COA (DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE + CONSTRAINTS OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER + CONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE), BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

The S3 must have a thorough understanding of the concept of operations from corps to division to brigade. The calculation of distance and time involved and a recommendation on the 1/3 - 2/3 rule are critical factors. The S3 must begin working with the S2 immediately. The S2 must quickly start his IPB. A well trained S2 section will have a head start on the IPB process and will have

collected all the products that division possesses, including products from topographic teams. IPB is an ongoing process that continues until the mission is completed.

S1: PROVIDE CURRENT PERSONNEL STATUS (ORGANIC UNITS AND ATTACHMENTS), NOTE KEY PERSONNEL LOSSES, ACTIVITY OF UNITS, FORECASTED PERSONNEL STATUS, HOST NATION SUPPORT AVAILABLE, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

S4: PROVIDE CURRENT VEHICLE AND WEAPON STATUS, FORECASTED VEHICLE AND WEAPON STATUS, SUPPLY STATUS (CLASSES I, III, IV, V), HIGHLIGHT CRITICAL COMBAT SYSTEMS AND CLASSES OF SUPPLY SHORTAGES, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

FSO: LIST ALL AVAILABLE FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS, RANGES, TYPE AND NUMBER OF MUNITIONS, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

ATTACHMENTS: NOTE KEY ASSETS (EQUIPMENT & PERSONNEL) AVAILABLE, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS, TASKS REQUIRED TO PERFORM, AND TIME AND ASSETS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE TASK, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

The remainder of the orders group have requirements to fulfill for briefing the brigade commander at S+1 hour 45 minutes.

S+15 MIN

BDE XO PROPOSES TIME SCHEDULE FOR PLANNING TO ORDERS GROUP

BDE CDR, BDE XO, AND S3 CONTINUE MISSION ANALYSIS: REVIEW SPECIFIED, ESSENTIAL & IMPLIED TASKS, DRAFT RESTATED MISSION (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY), COMMANDER'S INTENT [OBJECT (THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTION), REASON (END STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FRIENDLY FORCE, ENEMY AND TERRAIN), IMPORTANCE (HOW THE END STATE WILL BE ACHIEVED BY THE FORCE AS A WHOLE AND HOW FAR TO GO IN TERMS OF COMBAT POWER TO ACHIEVE THAT END STATE)], PROVIDE SPECIFIC AND GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR WARNING ORDER (WO) AND POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION (COA) TO CONSIDER, REVIEW TENTATIVE TIME SCHEDULE FOR TIME SPECIFIC EVENTS.

Based on the time considerations from the S3, the XO determines how much time is allocated for planning. One

third of the time is the maximum amount allotted to brigade, and attempts should always be made to complete the planning process in less time. As a minimum, the first meeting of the brigade commander, executive officer, and operations officer should result in a restated mission. The commander's intent, guidance for the warning order, and time specific events need to be provided as soon as possible. The commander most probably formulated some thoughts during the division order and the return trip from the division headquarters to the brigade main CP.

S+30 MIN

BDE XO PROVIDES RESTATED MISSION, BDE CDR'S INTENT AND GUIDANCE FOR WO FROM BDE CDR TO STAFF

S3 PLANS SECTION PUT RESTATED MISSION AND BDE CDR'S INTENT ON RESPECTIVE CHARTS

OBJECTIVE SKETCH PRODUCED IF FEASIBLE (S3 PLANS SECTION)

This is the first time that the brigade commander provides guidance to the orders group. The restated mission and intent assists the S3 in developing potential courses of action. The S3 will direct the production of the blowup sketch of the objective, which is helpful in synchronizing the battle.

S+45 MIN

ORDERS GROUP INPUT FOR WO SUBMITTED:

CHANGES TO TASK ORGANIZATION: S3

AREA OF OPERATIONS: S3 (8 DIGIT GRID COORDINATES OF BRIGADE ZONE OR SECTOR, BRIGADE OBJECTIVE, AXIS, TASK FORCE POSITIONS IF FEASIBLE)

ENEMY SITUATION: S2

BRIGADE MISSION: BDE CDR

INTENT: BDE CDR

TENTATIVE TIMELINE: S3 (INCLUDING EARLIEST TIME OF MOVE)

MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS: S3 / S4 / ORDERS GROUP
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE INSTRUCTIONS: S2
(SCOUTS MOVE NOT EARLIER THAN TIME)
DATE-TIME GROUP AND LOCATION OF OPORD OR FRAGO: S3
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ORDERS GROUP (PROJECTED MOPP
LEVEL, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED,
TRANSPORTATION)

AREA SET UP FOR FORMAL WO BRIEF (S3 PLANS SECTION)

There is no formal warning order format, but this particular format provides advance notice to subordinates and permits the start of parallel planning.

S+1 HR

S3: ISSUE WARNING ORDER VIA RADIO, MESSAGE, OR FORMAL BRIEF

FORMAL WO SEQUENCE OF BRIEF AS STATED ABOVE, AS A MINIMUM THE ORDERS GROUP RECEIVES A FORMAL WO, SUBORDINATE LIAISON OFFICERS ATTEND (SUB LNOs)

(ADDITIONAL WARNING ORDERS MAY BE GIVEN THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING PROCESS TO FACILITATE PARALLEL PLANNING)

A formal warning order to the orders group is a key part of keeping the orders group informed and directing part of their attention to future operations. As the planning process continues additional warning orders can be given at any time.

S+1 HR 30 MIN

ORDERS GROUP CONTINUES MISSION ANALYSIS, ENSURE CHARTS ARE FILLED OUT

ORDERS GROUP STARTS PARALLEL PLANNING WITH SUBORDINATE UNITS

Parallel planning with subordinate units facilitates their military decision making process by permitting them more time to plan. Posting key information on charts saves time.

S+1 HR 45 MIN

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF TO BDE CDR (LISTED ON
RESPECTIVE CHARTS)

:CORPS AND DIV CDR'S INTENT, RESTATED MISSION
(BDE XO)

:RESTATED MISSION (BDE XO)

:INITIAL IPB INCLUDING COO AND SITUATIONAL
TEMPLATE AND ENEMY MOST PROBABLE COAs, ENEMY
WEAKNESSES FOR EXPLOITATION (S2)

:FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS (ORDERS GROUP)

:IMPLIED, SPECIFIED, AND ESSENTIAL TASKS
(ORDERS GROUP)

:PLANNING FACTORS (MAJOR TASKS REQUIRED TO
PERFORM AND TIME AND ASSETS REQUIRED TO
COMPLETE TASK) (ORDERS GROUP)

:AVAILABLE ASSETS (MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS:
NUMBER, RANGES, TYPE OF MUNITIONS)
(ORDERS GROUP)

:LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE OPERATION
(ORDERS GROUP)

:ISSUES (SHORTFALLS AND WARSTOPPERS)
(ORDERS GROUP)

:RECOMMENDATIONS (ORDERS GROUP)

:REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (ORDERS GROUP)

(EACH MEMBER OF ORDERS GROUP: S2, S3, FSO, FSCoord,
ALO, AVN LNO, CEMO, ENG, MI, ADA, MP, CA, PSYOPS, OTHER
ATTACHMENTS, S1, S4, FSB CDR, BSO HIGHLIGHTS ONLY KEY ITEMS
IN HIS RESPECTIVE AREA) SUB LNOs ATTEND

The mission analysis brief is the first formal brief
to the brigade commander encompassing all the factors that
need to be addressed reference future operations. The
brief needs to be limited to forty five minutes and the
orders group needs to highlight only key items under tasks,
planning factors, available assets, limitations,
constraints, issues, and requests for information.
Recommendations to any problems identified should be
presented as the problem is briefed.

S+2 HR 30 MIN

S2 CONTINUES THREAT INTEGRATION: DEVELOP INITIAL
EVENT TEMPLATE AND MATRIX (TIME RELATED EVENTS WITH
CRITICAL AREAS, NAIs, TIME PHASED LINES)

S3 PLANS DETERMINES FORCE RATIOS

ORDERS GROUP: RFIs BY BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM
(BOS) FROM S+1 HR 45 MIN BRIEF SENT TO HIGHER HQs VIA
RADIO, LNO, OR FAX

The S2 continues his IPB and discusses the event
template with the S3. The S3 plans can start collecting
information for the course of action development and
wargaming such as force ratios and critical events.

S+2 HR 45 MIN

BDE CDR PROVIDES ADDITIONAL COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE TO
BDE XO / ORDERS GROUP

1. RESTATED MISSION
2. INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATION
REVISED COMMANDER'S INTENT
(PURPOSE, METHOD, ENDSTATE)
BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE
OFFENSE: MAIN AND SUPPORTING ATTACK, RESERVE
OPERATIONS (OPS), RECON AND SECURITY OPS,
DEEP OPS, AND REAR OPS
DEFENSE: SECURITY FORCES FORWARD AND ON FLANKS
OF MAIN BATTLE AREA (MBA), DEFENSIVE OPS IN
MBA, RESERVE OPS, DEEP OPS FORWARD OF FRONT
LINE OF TROOPS, AND REAR OPS
3. SPECIFIC COA(S) TO CONSIDER OR NOT CONSIDER AND
HOW MANY
4. INITIAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER
OUTLINE OF MOVEMENT
IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES
ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ZONES, SECTORS, OR
AREAS
PRESCRIBE FORMATIONS
IDENTIFY MANEUVER OPTIONS:
OFFENSE (FRONTAL ATTACK, PENETRATION,
ENVELOPMENT, TURNING MOVEMENT, INFILTRATION)
DEFENSE (MOBILE, AREA)
AREAS IN WHICH HE WILL ACCEPT RISK
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND TARGET ACQUISITION
GUIDANCE
GUIDANCE ON DECEPTION PLANNING
(TARGET AND OBJECTIVE)
COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS
SIZE, TYPE, AND COMPOSITION OF RESERVE
COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
(CCIR)
INITIAL PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)
DESIRED EFFECTS OF SUPPORTING FIRE ASSETS
NBC GUIDANCE
POSTURE / POSITION FOR FOLLOW ON MISSION
CONSIDERATIONS FOR TASK ORGANIZATION

POTENTIAL ENGINEER AND AIR DEFENSE EFFORT
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT INSTRUCTIONS

5. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON TIME
6. SELECT ORDERS FORMAT BASED ON MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM TIME: ORAL ORDER, OVERLAY ORDER, MATRIX ORDER, FILL IN THE BLANK ORDER WITH MATRIX ANNEXES, WRITTEN ORDER WITH WRITTEN ANNEXES
7. SELECT REHEARSAL TECHNIQUE BASED ON MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM TIME: RADIO/TELEPHONE REHEARSAL, MAP REHEARSAL, SKETCH MAP REHEARSAL, SAND-TABLE / TERRAIN MODEL REHEARSAL (TACTICAL EXERCISE WITHOUT TROOPS), KEY LEADER REHEARSAL, FULL DRESS REHEARSAL

OBJECTIVE BLOWUP COMPLETED & POSTED (S3 PLANS SECTION)

The guidance the brigade commander provides sets the stage for the rest of the orders process. Any refinements are made to the mission and commander's intent. If the intent statement does not mention the entire battlefield framework, it should be addressed at this time. Specific guidance on courses of action (COA) to consider or not consider, and the selection of the orders format to follow, and the type of rehearsal technique will assist the staff and save time in the decision making process. Each of the battlefield operating systems (BOS) needs to be mentioned under the initial concept of the operation as well as the risk the commander is willing to accept. If each BOS is addressed by the commander it will facilitate the COA development, wargaming and parallel planning phases.

S+3 HR

BDE CDR CONDUCTS RECONNAISSANCE (MAP, AIR, OR GROUND)

The brigade commander will now have the time to confirm or adjust his guidance based on his

reconnaissance. Air is the fastest means available if weather and the enemy's air defenses permit the flight. The commander may want to take some key staff members on the reconnaissance. If this occurs the XO and staff assistants will have to conduct the COA development and wargaming.

S3 MEETS WITH S2, FSO, S1, S4, ENG, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ORDERS GROUP AS NEEDED, AND CONDUCTS DETAILED PLANNING FOR COURSES OF ACTION (COAs) AND INITIAL WARGAMING

The initial meeting for COA development must consider the brigade commander's guidance. The meeting can not exceed forty five minutes.

S2 REVIEWS THE MODIFIED COMBINED OBSTACLE OVERLAY (MCOO) [HIGHLIGHTING KEY AND DECISIVE TERRAIN AND EFFECTS OF TERRAIN ON FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES (OCOKA)] DISCUSS INITIAL EVENT TEMPLATE HIGHLIGHTING AVENUES OF APPROACH AND MOBILITY CORRIDORS FOR FRIENDLY AND ENEMY, NAIs, ENEMY DPs, TIME LINES, ENEMY OBJECTIVES (IMMEDIATE, SUBSEQUENT, FINAL)

S2 BRIEFS MOST PROBABLE AND MOST DANGEROUS COURSE(S) OF ACTION (ATTACK, DEFEND, REINFORCE, RETROGRADE), SUPPORT CAPABILITIES (ARTILLERY, AIR, NBC, AT, EW, RECON, ADA, EN), HOW THE ENEMY WOULD FIGHT THE BATTLE AND REACT TO FRIENDLY ACTIONS (ENEMY DSM/DST), ENEMY VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES

S3:

ANALYZE RELATIVE FORCE RATIOS

ESTABLISH COMPARISON VALUES

COMPUTE THE RELATIVE FIGURES (CONSIDER WEATHER, INITIATIVE, SURPRISE, LOGISTICS, LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, MORALE, AND SKILL)

EVALUATE THE RESULTS

ARRAY INITIAL FORCES FOR INITIAL WARGAMING

DETERMINE THE RATIO OF FRIENDLY UNITS REQUIRED

DEFEND FROM HASTY OR FORTIFIED: 1:3

ATTACK HASTY POSITION: 2.5:1

DETERMINE THE SIZE OF UNIT TO BE ARRAYED

(AA SIZE-BN, ARRAY COMPANIES)

DETERMINE A PROPOSED FEBA (DEFENSE) OR LD/LC (OFFENSE)

DEVELOP THE DECEPTION PLAN
 (OBJECTIVE, TARGET, STORY)
 MAKE INITIAL ARRAY OF FRIENDLY FORCES
 DEFENSE: ARRAY COMPANIES TO BLOCK ENEMY AAs
 OFFENSE: ARRAY COMPANIES ON ALL AAs
 DEVELOP THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER IN GENERAL TERMS
 ADDRESS BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE (COVERING
 FORCE/SECURITY, DEEP OPERATIONS, CLOSE
 OPERATIONS, REAR OPERATIONS, RESERVE)
 ADDRESS ALL MANEUVER FORCES
 CONDUCT INITIAL WARGAME IN GENERAL TERMS
 DETERMINE COMMAND CONTROL MEANS AND MANEUVER CONTROL
 MEASURES
 ALLOCATE MAJOR SUBORDINATE HEADQUARTERS OVER
 THE FORCES
 SELECT DESIRED GRAPHICS TO CONTROL THE MAJOR
 SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (MSCs)
 PREPARE COA STATEMENT(S) AND SKETCH(ES)
 COA STATEMENT(S): COVER WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW
 AND WHY IN BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE AND COVER
 PURPOSE, MAIN EFFORT OR MAIN ATTACK, SCHEME
 OF MANEUVER, AND RISK
 COA SKETCH(ES) INCLUDE: AVENUES OF APPROACH,
 MAJOR TERRAIN FEATURES, MAJOR OBSTACLES, MSC
 UNIT BOUNDARIES, ZONES OF ATTACK OR DEFENSE
 SECTORS, PHASE LINES, ASSEMBLY AREAS,
 STRONGPOINTS, BATTLE POSITIONS, OBJECTIVES,
 ENGAGEMENT AREAS, FEBA/LD, MAIN EFFORT, AND
 ALLOCATED FORCES

The S2 starts the COA development by highlighting the
 modified combined obstacle overlay and the event template.
 The enemy's most probable COA is also selected. Based on
 the S2's analysis, the S3 arrays companies for initial
 wargaming while analyzing force ratios. The S3 addresses
 the entire battlefield structure via COA statements and
 sketches.

S+3 HR 45 MIN

BDE XO PRESENTS COAs TO ORDERS GROUP (UTILIZE
 BLOWUP) AND PRIORITIZES CRITICAL ITEMS TO FOCUS ON DURING
 STAFF ESTIMATES AND PREPARATION OF DECISION MATRICES

S4: IDENTIFY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES,
 REQUIREMENTS FOR CSS, ESTIMATED ATTRITION

S1: IDENTIFY PROJECTION OF BATTLE LOSSES IN PERSONNEL

REMAINDER OF ORDERS GROUP: DETERMINE HOW CAN BEST SUPPORT MISSION AND REQUIREMENTS

ORDERS GROUP: DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT, RISK, ADVANTAGES, AND DISADVANTAGES AND DEVELOP STAFF ESTIMATES (FM 101-5) ON COA's

The entire orders group is briefed by the XO on the COAs developed by the primary staff. Also the orders group is instructed on which key factors to focus on for their staff estimates such as the highlights of the brigade commander's intent and principles of war.

S+4 HR

ORDERS GROUP DISCUSSES STAFF ESTIMATES AND DECISION MATRICES WITH BDE XO (BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH BDE CDR)

BDE XO COMPARE COAs RESULTS (USE DECISION MATRIX OR LIST ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES)

At the end of the wargaming the orders group provides their feedback to the XO.

S+4 HR 15 MIN

COA AND INITIAL WARGAMING BRIEF TO BDE CDR

S2: REVIEW MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COA AND INTELLIGENCE UPDATES

S3: REVIEW COAs

FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, CHEMA, ENG, MI, ADA, MP, CA,

PSYOPS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS, S1, S4, BSO: WHAT COAs

YOU CAN SUPPORT AND WHICH COA CAN BEST BE SUPPORTED

BDE XO: BOTTOM LINE RECOMMENDATION-HIGHLIGHT

SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH

COA, IDENTIFY BRANCHES AND SEQUELS

SUB LNOS ATTEN

The orders group has thirty minutes to brief the brigade commander on the COAs considered and wargamed. The XO can speak for the entire orders group or each individual can highlight his area. The XO will rank order and discuss the COAs and make a recommendation.

S+4 HR 15 MIN

BDE CDR MAKES DECISION AND SELECTS COA AND FURTHER DEVELOPS CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

1. REVIEW MISSION & COMMANDER'S INTENT
(NOTE ANY CHANGES)
2. PROVIDE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS INCLUDING
ACTIONS IN DEEP, CLOSE, REAR, SECURITY, AND
RESERVES
3. REFINE GENERAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER
4. CONFIRM TASK ORGANIZATION
5. SPECIFY CONTROL MEASURES
6. IDENTIFY MAIN EFFORT AND HOW TO WEIGHT IT WITH
COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, AND COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT ASSETS, SUPPORT EFFORT, FOLLOW AND
SUPPORT EFFORT, & RESERVE
7. SPECIFY EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR MANEUVER AND
FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENTS
8. CONFIRM PRIORITY AND EFFECTS OF FIRES
9. HIGHLIGHT CSS CONCERNS
10. NOTE COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
11. DISCUSS ACCEPTABLE RISK

The brigade commander selects or modifies a COA and provides final guidance until the draft order brief at S+8 Hour 30 Minutes. All members of the orders group should address any concerns to the brigade commander at this time with possible recommendations.

S+5 HR 15 MIN

ORDERS GROUP CONDUCTS FINAL DETAILED WARGAMING (SLE LNOs ATTEND)

S3: WARGAMING SEQUENCE:

GATHER THE TOOLS (ENEMY AND FRIENDLY COA, ENEMY TEMPLATE, CURRENT FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS, 1:50,000 MAP, SKETCHES)

LIST FRIENDLY FORCES (ALL ORGANIC, ASSIGNED, ATTACHED AND OPCON UNITS AND PRIORITY OF SUPPORT PROVIDED BY HIGHER AND ASSETS SUCH AS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION, AND TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE)
LIST THE ASSUMPTIONS DELIVERED DURING MISSION ANALYSIS

LIST KNOWN CRITICAL EVENTS AND DECISION POINTS
OFFENSE: DEEP OPERATIONS, PASSAGE OF LINES, BREACHING OF MAIN OBSTACLE BELT, PENETRATIONS OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, SEIZING THE OBJECTIVE, REACTION OF ENEMY COUNTERATTACK FORCES, RIVER CROSSING, USE OF RESERVES

DEFENSE: DEEP OPERATIONS, BATTLE HANDOVER,
DESTRUCTION OF FIRST ECHELON FORCES,
DESTRUCTION OF FOLLOW ON FORCES, COMMITMENT OF
COUNTERATTACK FORCES OR RESERVES
SELECT A WARGAME METHOD (AVENUE-IN-DEPTH (SLOWEST),
BELT TECHNIQUE, BOX TECHNIQUE (FASTEST))
SELECT A TECHNIQUE TO RECORD AND DISPLAY THE RESULTS
(MENTAL NOTES, NARRATIVE, WORKSHEET,
SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX)
WAR GAME THE BATTLE USING PROCESS OF
ACTION-REACTION-ATTRITION-COUNTERACTION AND
ASSESS THE RESULTS

The S3 should already have the maps, templates, and
COA sketches needed for wargaming. A list of friendly
forces, assets, assumptions, critical events, and initial
decision points are necessary to ensure synchronization
during the wargaming. The selection of a war game method
and a technique to record and display the results will
assist in time management. The actual wargaming starts
with the unit initiating the offensive action. After the
initial offensive action, a reaction responds, and a
determination is made of the losses to personnel and
equipment. The next step is a counteraction and then the
wargame continues with the next action, reaction,
attrition, and counteraction.

S3: FOR EACH COA WARGAMED: MAKE REFINEMENTS OR
MODIFICATIONS TO THE COA, IDENTIFY BRANCHES, IDENTIFY
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION, IDENTIFY TASKS
TO MANEUVER UNITS, PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF BATTLE DURATION
OF EACH CRITICAL EVENT AND THE ENTIRE BATTLE, CALCULATE
FORCE RATIOS AT EACH OBJECTIVE, IDENTIFY ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES, PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF KILOMETER LOSS OR
GAIN, IDENTIFY REQUIRED USE OF OTHER COMBAT CAPABILITIES,
IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL CRITICAL EVENTS, ASSESS POTENTIAL FOR
NUCLEAR AND/OR CHEMICAL EFFECTS, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT SUPPORT, DECEPTION, AND SURPRISE.
PROVIDE INPUT TO THE DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE, DETERMINE
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PLAN FOR SEQUELS

S2: ACT AS AN ADVERSARY IN WARGAMING, IDENTIFY REACTIONS, PROVIDE A PROJECTION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENEMY FORCE DEFEATED IN EACH CRITICAL EVENT AND OVERALL, VERIFY PIR, NAIs AND TAIs, PREPARE FINAL EVENT TEMPLATE

ORDERS GROUP: INTERJECT WHERE APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY ACTION/REACTION RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY

The orders group has one hour and forty five minutes to complete the wargame. The XO must make sure the wargaming continues to flow smoothly and avoids diversions. The S2 and S3 should physically be arraying and moving forces on the map for the selected COA. Recorders should be annotating the results and tracking the requirements listed under the S3 and S2's responsibilities. All members of the orders group must know the enemy's capabilities and limitations. The sequencing of the S2 and S3 should only be interrupted if a warstopper is identified.

S+7 HR

ORDERS GROUP CONDUCTS DETAILED PLANNING FOR ORDER AND CONTINUES PARALLEL STAFF PLANNING WITH SUBORDINATE UNITS

BDE XO DETERMINES NEED FOR UPDATED WARNING ORDER

BDE XO ANNOUNCES ANNEXES REQUIRED FOR ORDER (ANNEX A, B, C, D, E, V MANDATORY)(TO BE DETERMINED: F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC)

BRIGADE TARGETING CELL REFINES PRIORITY TARGETS, HIGH PAYOFF TARGETS, COMMANDER'S ATTACK CRITERIA, AND TAIs

S2 CONTINUE THREAT INTEGRATION WITH FINAL EVENT TEMPLATE AND DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE + OPERATIONS ESTIMATE IN GRAPHIC FORM + TAIs + DECISION POINTS (DPs)) BASED ON FRIENDLY COA SELECTED

BDE XO CONTACT DIVISION HEADQUARTERS TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENT FOR BRIEF BACK TO DIV CDR, IF REQUIRED THE FORMAT FOR BRIEF IS:

1. RESULTS OF MISSION ANALYSIS
(SPEC/IMP TASKS)(S3/BDE CDR)
2. TASK ORGANIZATION (S3 / BDE CDR)
3. MISSION (TASK AND PURPOSE) (S3 / BDE CDR)
4. COMMANDERS INTENT (S3 / BDE CDR)
5. SEVEN BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS:
 - A. INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE (S2)
 - B. MANEUVER (S3)
 - C. FIRE SUPPORT (FSO)
 - D. MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY,
NBC (ENG, CHEMA)
 - E. ADA/ARMY AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (S3 AIR /
ADA LNO/AVN LNO)
 - F. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (S4/S1)
 - G. COMMAND, CONTROL, & COMMUNICATIONS (BSO/S3)
6. RISKS BRIGADE WILL HAVE TO TAKE
7. CONFIRMATION OF THE DIVISION AND FLANK ROLES
8. REQUIREMENTS FROM HIGHER TO FACILITATE SUCCESS
9. ISSUES (ORDERS GROUP - REVIEW RFIs)

S3 & S2 DISCUSS COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PLAN AND
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (R&S) PLAN, CONFIRM SCHEME
OF RECONNAISSANCE, ASSIGNMENT OF DPs, NAIs, R&S OVERLAY

The XO informs the orders group of any requirements
for another warning order, potential annexes, and brief
back to the division commander.

S+7 HR 30 MIN

SET UP BRIEFING AREA (S3 PLANS)

BRIEF BACK DIV CDR (IF MANDATED)

S+7 HR 45 MIN

ORDERS GROUP REVIEW OVERLAYS WITH S3 / BDE XO TO
AVOID FRATRICIDE (ALL OVERLAYS TO INCLUDE MANEUVER
GRAPHICS, OBSTACLES/MINES + FA TARGETS + ENEMY AAs +
FRIENDLY POSITIONS + FIELD ARTILLERY PLATOON / BATTERY
LOCATIONS + MI ASSETS + R&S + ADA LOCATIONS + BRIGADE
SUPPORT AREA (BSA), AND OTHER ATTACHMENT POSITIONS ARE
OVERLAYED TO IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES)

The matching of overlays is a critical step in the
orders process. Any duplications of unit locations and
potential fratricide will be resolved.

S+8 HR 30 MIN

ORDERS GROUP BRIEFS DRAFT ORDER TO BDE CDR / BDE XO

BDE CDR PROVIDES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON ORDER IF
NEEDED

S+9 HR 30 MIN

S3 BRIEFS EXECUTION MATRIX TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

A necessary step in the orders process is to brief
future operations to the officers and non-commissioned
officers involved in current operations. All members of
the main CP must be informed.

35

S+10 HR

BDE XO RECEIVES AND REVIEWS ORDER AND ANNEXES AND
OVERLAYS

ORDERS GROUP REPRODUCES FINAL COPIES OF
ORDER/OVERLAYS UPON APPROVAL OF BDE XO

S+11 HR

ORDERS GROUP PROVIDE FINAL COPIES OF ORDER/OVERLAYS
TO S3 PLANS FOR COLLATION

SET UP BRIEFING AREA FOR BRIGADE OPERATIONS ORDER
(S3 PLANS SECTION)

The collation of the order and overlays is very
important. The goal is to provide the final product to the
subordinate commanders prior to the orders briefing. This
allows time for the subordinates to read the order and
thereby reduce the time needed by the subordinates to take
notes and ask questions during the orders brief.

S+12 HR

ISSUE ORDER (AREA TO BE BRIEFED AND BRIEFING
SEQUENCE)

1. AO, T/O, MISSION: XO (PUT ON CHART)
2. COMMANDERs INTENT: BDE CDR (PUT ON CHART)
3. ENEMY SITUATION: S2
4. FRIENDLY SITUATION: S3
5. MANEUVER: S3
 - A. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATIONS
 - B. TASKS TO MANEUVER UNITS
 - C. KEY COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
6. PERTINENT HIGHLIGHTS OF PARAGRAPHS 3, 4, AND 5
AND ANNEXES: ASSIGNMENTS FOR ORDER: COMBAT
MULTIPLIER BRIEFING (FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, CEMO,
ENG, MI, ADA, MP, CA, PSYOPS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS

ANNEXES:

- *ANNEX A: TASK ORGANIZATION (S3)
- *ANNEX B: INTELLIGENCE (S2)
- *ANNEX C: OPERATIONS OVERLAY (S3)
- *ANNEX D: FIRE SUPPORT (FSO)
- *ANNEX E: SERVICE AND SUPPORT (S4)
- ANNEX F: CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS (CA)
- ANNEX G: ENGINEER (ENG)
- ANNEX H: AIR DEFENSE (ADA)
- ANNEX I: ARMY AVIATION (S3 AIR)
- ANNEX J: AIRSPACE UTILIZATION (AVN LNO)
- ANNEX K: COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS (BSO)
- ANNEX L: REAR OPERATIONS (S4)
- ANNEX M: ELECTRONIC WARFARE (S3)
- ANNEX N: DECEPTION (S3)
- ANNEX O: BARRIER AND DENIAL (ENG)
- ANNEX P: COUNTERATTACK PLAN (S3)
- ANNEX Q: AIR MOVEMENT (S3/AIR)
- ANNEX R: GROUND MOVEMENT (S4)
- ANNEX S: CROSSING PLANS (ENG)
- ANNEX T: OPERATIONS SECURITY (S3)
- ANNEX U: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS)
- *ANNEX V: SAFETY (S1)
- ANNEX W: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (S1)
- ANNEX X: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (CHEMO)
- ANNEX Y: DISTRIBUTION (S3)
- ANNEX Z: REPORTS (ALL)
- ANNEX AA: AIRMOBILE / AIR ASSAULT (AIR)
- ANNEX BB: CONTINGENCY MISSION (S3)
- ANNEX CC: RELIGIOUS SUPPORT (CHAP)
- * MANDATORY FOR ALL OPERATIONS
- 7. SERVICE SUPPORT: S1 / S4
- 8. COMMAND & SIGNAL: BSO
- 9. SOLDIER CONCERNS: BDE CSM
- 10. CLOSING COMMENTS: BDE CDR

The orders group must be clear and concise in their presentations in order to keep the presentation length of the order to one hour.

S+13 HR

ORDERS GROUP SUPERVISES EXECUTION BY SUBORDINATE UNITS AND ANSWERS ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

S+13 HR 30 MIN

BACK BRIEF TO BDE CDR BY BATTALION COMMANDERS (INFANTRY, ARMOR, ARTILLERY, FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION, AND AVIATION) REFERENCE UNIT'S MISSION, TASKS AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BDE CDR'S INTENT (ORDER OF BRIEF: MAIN EFFORT, SUPPORTING EFFORT, FOLLOW AND SUPPORT, RESERVE) BDE XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, AND FSO SHOULD BE PRESENT FOR COMMENTS

S+15 HR

ORDERS GROUP SUBMIT OVERLAYS FOR TERRAIN MANAGEMENT
BOARD TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

TBD

STAFF, LOGISTIC, AND TOC REHEARSALS

TBD

BRIEF BACK TO BDE CDR

TBD

BRIGADE REHEARSAL

The back brief to the brigade commander confirms the subordinate commanders knowledge of their responsibilities. Rehearsals identify weaknesses in the plan and are essential to synchronization.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In war, time always presses; therefore, leaders should be quick to seize upon any timesaving expedient In brief, utilize every timesaving device that ingenuity and forethought can devise. 47

The answer to the original question: Will a timeline expedite the brigade military decision making process?, is "yes". The purpose of this section is to summarize the Army's position on time and time management, suggest useful concepts on time from other armies, and list the advantages and disadvantages of a timeline.

First, this monograph examined the importance the Army has emphasized in time and time management. The Army has established the 1/3 - 2/3 rule as the time standard and has tested that standard at the National Training Centers (NTCs). Forty two units out of sixty units from 1987 to 1992 that have rotated through the NTCs have failed to

effectively manage time according to standard. The common recommendation for improvement is to develop a planning timeline.

Second, of the doctrinal and academic literature reviewed, only one manual, FM 101-5 (Draft), provides a methodology to allocate time in the military decision making process and that is done in percentages. However, an explanation is not given on the details of the methodology. Critical events are not explained in detail, responsibilities are not assigned, and an explanation of the time percentages is lacking.

Third, the analysis of the British, German, and Russian military decision making processes reveals that all three armies believe in a very commander dominated planning process. The commander negates parts of the planning process by making decisions without input from the staff and thereby saves time. Perhaps two techniques, the use of nomograms and the networking method, that the Russians utilize could be adopted by the USA. These techniques require further investigation and are beyond the scope of this monograph.

Fourth, the brigade twelve hour planning timeline, and timelines in general, have numerous advantages. The twelve hour timeline can be expanded or contracted depending on the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. If more time is available, it should be added to the wargaming step. If less time is available, it should be taken from the mission analysis step. The

timeline provides a logical sequence for the military decision making process and guides the commander, staff, and attachments through a standardized, systematic planning process. Time is saved by allocating a specified amount of time to each part of the process and each member of the orders group knows what is required and when it is required. The timeline lets the commander know when his presence is required and what is expected of him.

The staff will be able to implement a rest plan and produce a plan that has incorporated all the battlefield operating systems. The plan can be delivered on time according to the 1/3 - 2/3 rule. The timeline also directs parallel planning with subordinates. The use of timelines can eventually lead to reducing the time needed to plan because of the familiarity of working with the timeline. The areas that the staff can practice, which increases staff proficiency, are intent development, COA development, wargaming, staff estimates, writing of orders, and the making of overlays. The implementation of IPB products by automation assists in saving time. The key to the timeline is discipline. The XO must enforce the time standards.


There are several drawbacks to timelines. With continual changes to the task organization, new or inexperienced staff officers will need some time to become familiar with the timeline. The proficiency, availability, and physical and mental condition of the various staff officers may impede the flow of the timeline. The

commander and executive officer's background with respect to training, leadership style, and knowledge of the situation may impact on the coherency of the timeline. Staff cohesion, cooperation, number of missions the staff is dealing with at the same time, and the type of mission may serve as a detriment to the timeline.

These drawbacks can be overcome as seen by the following comments in a JRTC take home package listed under unit strengths in command and control for a brigade task force. "The staff adhered to a rigidly enforced staff planning schedule, allocating no less than two-thirds of the available time to subordinate units."⁴⁸ In the same take home package under senior brigade observer/controller summary is another statement, "the brigade staff adhered to a disciplined and orderly staff planning process which resulted in all orders being issued well within the 1/3 -⁴⁹ 2/3s rule." The timeline referenced in these comments is the one presented in this monograph.

The timeline can be adapted for use at the battalion and division level. Modifications at the battalion level entail using less personnel in the orders group and usually considers less resources. At division, a distinct handoff occurs between the plans section and current operations, and more resources and staff are required for coordination and interface.

Appendix A: Tactical-estimate Procedures




Appendix B: Percentage of Available Planning
 51
 Time for CEs, ACEs, and TLPs

Tactical-Estimate Procedure Stage	CE	ACE	TLPs
Mission analysis	16	15	15
Mission analysis brief and commander's guidance	4	5	NA
COA development	7	10	5
Leader's reconnaissance	NA	NA	20
COA development brief	2	NA	NA
COA analysis	25	35	35
COA analysis brief	4	NA	NA
Preparing and issuing order	27	15	5
Rehearsing	15	20	20


CE: Command Estimate
 ACE: Abbreviated Command Estimate
 TLPs: Troop Leading Procedures

Appendix C: British Command Estimate

STAGE 1 MISSION ANALYSIS (20 % OF TIME AVAIL)		
FACTOR	DEDUCTION	TASK/CONSTRAINT




STAGE 2 FACTORS (50% OF TIME AVAIL)		
FACTOR	DEDUCTION	TASK/CONSTRAINT



Appendix C: British Command Estimate (continued)

STAGE 2 CONT. FACTOR DEDUCTION TASK/CONSTRAINT



STAGE 3 CONSIDERATION AND DECISION (30 % OF TIME AVAILABLE)


9. Assessment of tasks

Task	Recce armor inf artillery aviation air eng EW
List Tasks	Establish combat power required for each task, thinking two down

10. Courses

Consider courses open.

Compare troops required from para 9a above with troops available
Courses from options for reconciling troops available against troops required



Schematics:

1	2	3
---	---	---

11. Commander's decision

Main Effort? Coherent missions? Within capability of each subordinate? Risk?
Operational imperatives-command, information, firepower, logistics, sy, mov

Selection of Best Course - Commander's Decision

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline

N-1 HR

BRIGADE MAIN COMMAND POST (MAIN CP) NOTIFY ALL MEMBERS OF ORDERS GROUP OF UPCOMING OPERATION: ORDERS GROUP INCLUDES INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (S2), OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER (S3), FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION OFFICER (FSCoord), FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (FSO), BRIGADE EXECUTIVE OFFICER (BDE XO), BRIGADE SIGNAL OFFICER (BSO), AIR LIAISON OFFICER (ALO), ENGINEER LIAISON OFFICER (ENG), AIR DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICER (ADA), MILITARY INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER (MI), MILITARY POLICE LIAISON (MP), FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER (FSB CDR), LOGISTICS OFFICER (S4), PERSONNEL OFFICER (S1), AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER (AVN LNO), CHEMICAL OFFICER (CHEMO), CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA), PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFICER (PSYOPS), ASSISTANT BRIGADE S3 (S3 PLANS), OTHER ATTACHMENTS

PREPARE PLANNING AREA (TWO BLANK BUTCHER BLOCK PAPERS ON EASELS, MARKERS AVAILABLE, CUT PLASTIC FOR OVERLAYS, SAME SCALE MAPS POSTED, BLANK WARNING ORDERS (WO), BLANK REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (RFIs), BLANK OPERATIONS ORDER (OPORDER), BLANK FRAGMENTARY ORDER (FRAGO), BOARDS FOR: SPECIFIED TASKS, IMPLIED TASKS, ESSENTIAL TASKS, PLANNING FACTORS, MISSION, COMMANDER'S INTENT, COURSE OF ACTION, AND BRIEFING SEQUENCE, CHECK ALL EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR PLANNING SEQUENCE INCLUDING COMPUTERS, COPY MACHINE, AND PAPER) S3 PLANS SECTION

EACH MEMBER OF ORDERS GROUP PREPARES INDIVIDUAL WORK AREA, INCORPORATES NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS INTO ORDERS PROCESS, SHOULD HAVE STANDARDIZED ESTIMATE BOOK/FORMAT, COLLECT AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON THE FRIENDLY STATUS, AND BE FAMILIAR WITH ENEMY COUNTERPART'S SYSTEMS

N HR

RECEIVE MISSION (OPORDER, FRAGO, VERBAL ORDER OF COMMANDING OFFICER (VOCO)) AT DIVISION HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE COMMANDER (BDE CDR), S2, S3, FSO

THE REMAINDER OF ORDERS GROUP ALERTED BY S3 PLANS WHEN TO ASSEMBLE IN MAIN CP, BDE XO, BSO, ALO, ENG, ADA, MI, MP, FSB CDR, FSCoord, S4, S1, AVN LNO, CHEMO, CA, PSYOPS, S3 PLANS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS

N HR + TBD

BDE CDR BACK BRIEFS DIVISION COMMANDER (DIV CDR) REFERENCE BRIGADE'S MISSION, MAJOR TASKS, AND UNDERSTANDING OF DIV CDR'S INTENT

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

BDE CDR CONDUCTS INITIAL MISSION ANALYSIS AND FORMULATES INITIAL COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE WHILE RETURNING TO THE MAIN CP

S HR

BDE CDR, S3, S2, FSO ARRIVE AT MAIN CP

ORDERS GROUP ASSEMBLES IN MAIN CP

S3 PLANS SECTION NUMBERS SEQUENTIALLY EACH PAGE OF THE 'MASTER' ORDER INCLUDING ANNEXES

DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF ORDERS DIVISION PROVIDES AND AVAILABILITY OF A COPY MACHINE, A MINIMUM OF 6 COPIES OF MAIN BODY OF ORDER ARE NEEDED (S3 PLANS SECTION)
1-BDE CDR, 1-BDE XO, 1-BDE S3/S2/FSO, 1-S3 PLANS,
1-S4/S1/BSO, 1-REMAINDER OF ORDERS GROUP

DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF MANEUVER OVERLAYS DIVISION PROVIDES, A MINIMUM OF 4 COPIES ARE NEEDED (S3 PLANS SECTION) 1-BDE CDR, 1-BDE S3, 1-S3 PLANS, 1-MASTER USED BY ORDERS GROUP TO MAKE ADDITIONAL COPIES

ANNEXES PASSED TO APPROPRIATE STAFF OFFICERS (S3 PLANS SECTION)

ORDERS GROUP READS ORDER

EACH MEMBER OF ORDERS GROUP CONDUCTS INITIAL MISSION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFIES FACTS, ASSUMPTIONS, DETERMINES LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE OPERATION, SPECIFIED TASKS, ESSENTIAL TASKS, IMPLIED TASKS, RFIs, ISSUES (SHORTFALLS AND WARSTOPPERS), AVAILABLE ASSETS, PLANNING FACTORS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. LIST THESE ON RESPECTIVE CHARTS TO BE BRIEFED TO BDE CDR AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

S3: IDENTIFY TASK & PURPOSE, INTENT, AND DECEPTION PLAN OR DECEPTION OPERATIONS OF TWO LEVELS UP (DIVISION AND CORPS), ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK, AND BRIGADE'S ROLE WITH MAIN EFFORT, PROJECTED TASK ORGANIZATION (CHANGES IN ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS), CURRENT TASK ORGANIZATION (TWO LEVELS DOWN), CURRENT UNIT STATUS [UNIT LOCATIONS, UNIT COMBAT CAPABILITIES (TRAINING STATUS, EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL), UNIT ACTIVITY]], BE FAMILIAR WITH THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, CALCULATE AVAILABLE TIME AND TIME REQUIRED: BASED ON REVERSE PLANNING OF OPERATION TO BE CONDUCTED, PRESENT LOCATION, AND DISTANCE FROM THE AREA OF OPERATION. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BDE CDR AND BDE XO AS PART OF THE MISSION ANALYSIS. IDENTIFY AREA OF OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE TO S2 AND DETERMINE AREA OF INTEREST WITH S2

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

S2 SECTION: DISPLAY CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION, PROVIDE MOST COMPLETE IPB AVAILABLE INCLUDING INITIAL BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION: (AREA OF OPERATION AND AREA OF INTEREST), TERRAIN ANALYSIS: (IDENTIFY GAPS IN TERRAIN DATA, DEVELOP TERRAIN FACTORS OVERLAY, INTEGRATE WEATHER, DEVELOP COMBINED OBSTACLES OVERLAY (COO), IDENTIFY TARGETS IN DEEP OPERATIONS AREA, IDENTIFY ADEQUACY OF MANEUVER SPACE IN TERMS OF COMPANY SIZE MOBILITY CORRIDORS AND BATTALION AVENUES OF APPROACH FOR CLOSE OPERATIONS, IDENTIFY TARGETS IN REAR OPERATIONS AREA, AND ANALYZE EACH ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION IN TERMS OF OBSERVATION AND FIRE, COVER AND CONCEALMENT, OBSTACLES, KEY AND DECISIVE TERRAIN, EASE OF MOVEMENT IN TERMS OF GO, SLOW-CO, AND NO-GC TERRAIN, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR CHEMICAL DENIAL, USE OF COMBAT SURVEILLANCE DEVICES, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC. AND THE BEST AVENUE OF APPROACH), WEATHER ANALYSIS: LIGHT DATA (BEFORE MORNING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT, SUNRISE, SUNSET, END OF EVENING NAUTICAL TWILIGHT, MOONRISE, MOONSET, % ILLUMINATION), TEMPERATURE, HUMIDITY, PRECIPITATION, WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION, CLOUD COVER, VISIBILITY BY ALTITUDE, FORECAST, AFFECTS ON: VISUAL RECON, PHOTO RECON, CHEMICAL/NUCLEAR USE, MOBILITY, SOLDIER AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE, THREAT EVALUATION: DEVELOP THREAT DATA BASE SOURCES (ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK, PUBLICATIONS), EVALUATE THREAT CAPABILITIES [ENEMY'S COMPOSITION, ORGANIZATION, TACTICAL DOCTRINE, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, TRAINING), CHARACTERISTICS OF ENEMY VEHICLES, HOW HE MAKES USE OF ELECTRONIC COMBAT, ARTILLERY, NUCLEAR - BIOLOGICAL - CHEMICAL, ATTACK HELICOPTERS, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, CONVERT ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE INTO GRAPHIC FORM (DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE), IDENTIFY INITIAL HIGH VALUE TARGETS, WEAPON RANGE ARCS, AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY), AND INITIAL THREAT INTEGRATION: DEVELOP INITIAL SITUATIONAL TEMPLATE FOR MOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION (COA) AND MOST DANGEROUS COA (DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE + CONSTRAINTS OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER + CONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE), BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

S1: PROVIDE CURRENT PERSONNEL STATUS (ORGANIC UNITS AND ATTACHMENTS), NOTE KEY PERSONNEL LOSSES, ACTIVITY OF UNITS, FORECASTED PERSONNEL STATUS, HOST NATION SUPPORT AVAILABLE, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

S4: PROVIDE CURRENT VEHICLE AND WEAPON STATUS, FORECASTED VEHICLE AND WEAPON STATUS, SUPPLY STATUS (CLASSES I, III, IV, V), HIGHLIGHT CRITICAL COMBAT SYSTEMS AND CLASSES OF SUPPLY SHORTAGES, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

FSO: LIST ALL AVAILABLE FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS, RANGES, TYPE AND NUMBER OF MUNITIONS, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

ATTACHMENTS: NOTE KEY ASSETS (EQUIPMENT & PERSONNEL) AVAILABLE, CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS, TASKS REQUIRED TO PERFORM, AND TIME AND ASSETS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE TASK, BRIEF AT S+1 HR 45 MIN

S+15 MIN

BDE XO PROPOSES TIME SCHEDULE FOR PLANNING TO ORDERS GROUP

BDE CDR, BDE XO, AND S3 CONTINUE MISSION ANALYSIS: REVIEW SPECIFIED, ESSENTIAL & IMPLIED TASKS, DRAFT RESTATED MISSION (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, AND WHY), COMMANDER'S INTENT (OBJECT (THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTION), REASON (END STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FRIENDLY FORCE, ENEMY AND TERRAIN), IMPORTANCE (HOW THE END STATE WILL BE ACHIEVED BY THE FORCE AS A WHOLE AND HOW FAR TO GO IN TERMS OF COMBAT POWER TO ACHIEVE THAT END STATE)), PROVIDE SPECIFIC AND GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR WO AND POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION (COA) TO CONSIDER, REVIEW TENTATIVE TIME SCHEDULE FOR TIME SPECIFIC EVENTS.

S+30 MIN

BDE XO PROVIDES RESTATED MISSION, BDE CDR'S INTENT AND GUIDANCE FOR WO FROM BDE CDR TO STAFF

S3 PLANS SECTION PUT RESTATED MISSION AND BDE CDR'S INTENT ON RESPECTIVE CHARTS

OBJECTIVE SKETCH PRODUCED IF FEASIBLE (S3 PLANS SECTION)

S+45 MIN

ORDERS GROUP INPUT FOR WARNING ORDER (WO) SUBMITTED: CHANGES TO TASK ORGANIZATION: S3

AREA OF OPERATIONS: S3 (8 DIGIT GRID COORDINATES OF BRIGADE ZONE OR SECTOR, BRIGADE OBJECTIVE, AXIS, TASK FORCE POSITIONS IF FEASIBLE)

ENEMY SITUATION: S2

BRIGADE MISSION: BDE CDR

INTENT: BDE CDR

TENTATIVE TIMELINE: S3 (INCLUDING EARLIEST TIME OF MOVE)

MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS: S3 / S4 / ORDERS GROUP

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE INSTRUCTIONS: S2 (SCOUTS MOVE NOT EARLIER THAN TIME)

DATE-TIME GROUP AND LOCATION OF OPORD OR FRAGO: S3

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ORDERS GROUP (PROJECTED MOPP LEVEL, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED, TRANSPORTATION)

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

AREA SET UP FOR FORMAL WO BRIEF (S3 PLANS SECTION)

S+1 HR

S3: ISSUE WARNING ORDER VIA RADIO, MESSAGE, OR FORMAL BRIEF

FORMAL WO SEQUENCE OF BRIEF AS STATED ABOVE, AS A MINIMUM THE ORDERS GROUP RECEIVES A FORMAL WO, SUBORDINATE LIAISON OFFICERS ATTEND (SUB LNOs)

(ADDITIONAL WARNING ORDERS MAY BE GIVEN THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING PROCESS TO FACILITATE PARALLEL PLANNING)

S+1 HR 30 MIN

ORDERS GROUP CONTINUES MISSION ANALYSIS, ENSURE CHARTS ARE FILLED OUT

ORDERS GROUP STARTS PARALLEL PLANNING WITH SUBORDINATE UNITS

S+1 HR 45 MIN

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF TO BDE CDR (LISTED ON RESPECTIVE CHARTS)

:CORPS AND DIV CDR'S INTENT, RESTATED MISSION (BDE XO)

:RESTATED MISSION (BDE XO)

:INITIAL IPB INCLUDING COO AND SITUATIONAL TEMPLATE AND ENEMY MOST PROBABLE COAs, ENEMY WEAKNESSES FOR EXPLOITATION (S2)

:FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS (ORDERS GROUP)

:IMPLIED, SPECIFIED, AND ESSENTIAL TASKS (ORDERS GROUP)

:PLANNING FACTORS (MAJOR TASKS REQUIRED TO PERFORM AND TIME AND ASSETS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE TASK) (ORDERS GROUP)

:AVAILABLE ASSETS (MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS: NUMBER, RANGES, TYPE OF MUNITIONS)

(ORDERS GROUP)

:LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE OPERATION (ORDERS GROUP)

:ISSUES (SHORTFALLS AND WARSTOPPERS)

(ORDERS GROUP)

:RECOMMENDATIONS (ORDERS GROUP)

:RFIs (ORDERS GROUP)

(EACH MEMBER OF ORDERS GROUP: S2, S3, FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, CHEMO, ENG, MI, ADA, MP, CA, PSYOPS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS, S1, S4, BSO HIGHLIGHTS ONLY KEY ITEMS IN HIS RESPECTIVE AREA) SUB LNOs ATTEND

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

S+2 HR 30 MIN

S2 CONTINUES THREAT INTEGRATION: DEVELOP EVENT TEMPLATE AND MATRIX (TIME RELATED EVENTS WITH CRITICAL AREAS, NAIs, TIME PHASED LINES)

S3 PLANS DETERMINE FORCE RATIOS

ORDERS GROUP: RFIs BY BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM (BOS) FROM S+1 HR 45 MIN BRIEF SENT TO HIGHER HQs VIA RADIO, LNO, OR FAX

S+2 HR 45 MIN

BDE CDR PROVIDES ADDITIONAL COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE TO BDE XO / ORDERS GROUP

1. RESTATED MISSION
2. INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATION
REVISED COMMANDER'S INTENT
(PURPOSE, METHOD, ENDSTATE)
BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE
OFFENSE: MAIN AND SUPPORTING ATTACK, RESERVE OPERATIONS (OPS), RECON AND SECURITY OPS, DEEP OPS, AND REAR OPS
DEFENSE: SECURITY FORCES FORWARD AND ON FLANKS OF MAIN BATTLE AREA (MBA), DEFENSIVE OPS IN MBA, RESERVE OPS, DEEP OPS FORWARD OF THE FRONT LINE OF TROOPS, AND REAR OPS
3. SPECIFIC COA(S) TO CONSIDER OR NOT CONSIDER AND HOW MANY
4. INITIAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER
OUTLINE OF MOVEMENT
IDENTIFY OBJECTIVES
ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ZONES, SECTORS, OR AREAS
PRESCRIBE FORMATIONS
IDENTIFY MANEUVER OPTIONS:
OFFENSE (FRONTAL ATTACK, PENETRATION, ENVELOPMENT, TURNING MOVEMENT, INFILTRATION)
DEFENSE: (MOBILE, AREA)
AREAS IN WHICH HE WILL ACCEPT RISK
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND TARGET ACQUISITION GUIDANCE
GUIDANCE ON DECEPTION PLANNING
(TARGET AND OBJECTIVE)
COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS
SIZE, TYPE, AND COMPOSITION OF RESERVE
COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)
INITIAL PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)
DESIRED EFFECTS OF SUPPORTING FIRE ASSETS

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

NBC GUIDANCE

POSTURE / POSITION FOR FOLLOW ON MISSION
CONSIDERATIONS FOR TASK ORGANIZATION
POTENTIAL ENGINEER AND AIR DEFENSE EFFORT
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT INSTRUCTIONS

5. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON TIME
6. SELECT ORDERS FORMAT BASED ON MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM TIME: ORAL ORDER, OVERLAY ORDER, MATRIX ORDER, FILL IN THE BLANK ORDER WITH MATRIX ANNEXES, WRITTEN ORDER WITH WRITTEN ANNEXES
7. SELECT REHEARSAL TECHNIQUE BASED ON MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM TIME: RADIO/TELEPHONE REHEARSAL, MAP REHEARSAL, SKETCH MAP REHEARSAL, SAND-TABLE / TERRAIN MODEL REHEARSAL, ROCK/STICK DRILL, KEY LEADER REHEARSAL (TACTICAL EXERCISE WITHOUT TROOPS), FULL DRESS REHEARSAL

OBJECTIVE BLOWUP COMPLETED & POSTED (S3 PLANS SECTION)

S+3 HR

BDE CDR CONDUCTS RECONNAISSANCE (MAP, AIR, OR GROUND)

S3 MEETS WITH S2, FSO, S1, S4, ENG, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ORDERS GROUP AS NEEDED, AND CONDUCTS DETAILED PLANNING FOR COURSES OF ACTION (COAs) AND INITIAL WARGAMING

S2 REVIEWS THE MODIFIED COMBINED OBSTACLE OVERLAY (MCOO) (HIGHLIGHTING KEY AND DECISIVE TERRAIN AND EFFECTS OF TERRAIN ON FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES (OCOKA)), DISCUSS INITIAL EVENT TEMPLATE HIGHLIGHTING AVENUES OF APPROACH AND MOBILITY CORRIDORS FOR FRIENDLY AND ENEMY, NAIs, ENEMY DPs, TIME LINES, ENEMY OBJECTIVES (IMMEDIATE, SUBSEQUENT, FINAL)

S2 BRIEFS MOST PROBABLE AND MOST DANGEROUS COURSE(S) OF ACTION (ATTACK, DEFEND, REINFORCE, RETROGRADE), SUPPORT CAPABILITIES (ARTILLERY, AIR, NBC, AT, EW, RECON, ADA, EN), HOW THE ENEMY WOULD FIGHT THE BATTLE AND REACT TO FRIENDLY ACTIONS (ENEMY DSM/DST), ENEMY VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES

S3:

ANALYZE RELATIVE FORCE RATIOS
ESTABLISH COMPARISON VALUES
COMPUTE THE RELATIVE FIGURES (CONSIDER WEATHER, INITIATIVE, SURPRISE, LOGISTICS, LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, MORALE, AND SKILL)
EVALUATE THE RESULTS

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

ARRAY INITIAL FORCES

DETERMINE THE RATIO OF FRIENDLY UNITS REQUIRED
DEFEND FROM HASTY OR FORTIFIED: 1:3
ATTACK HASTY POSITION: 2.5:1
DETERMINE THE SIZE OF UNIT TO BE ARRAYED
(AA SIZE-BN, ARRAY COMPANIES)
DETERMINE A PROPOSED FEBA (DEFENSE) OR LD/LC
(OFFENSE)
DEVELOP THE DECEPTION PLAN
(OBJECTIVE, TARGET, STORY)
MAKE INITIAL ARRAY OF FRIENDLY FORCES
DEFENSE: ARRAY COMPANIES TO BLOCK ENEMY AAs
OFFENSE: ARRAY COMPANIES ON ALL AAs
DEVELOP THE SCHEME OF MANEUVER IN GENERAL TERMS
ADDRESS BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE (COVERING
FORCE/SECURITY, DEEP OPERATIONS, CLOSE
OPERATIONS, REAR OPERATIONS, RESERVE)
ADDRESS ALL MANEUVER FORCES
CONDUCT INITIAL WARGAME IN GENERAL TERMS
DETERMINE COMMAND CONTROL MEANS AND MANEUVER CONTROL
MEASURES
ALLOCATE MAJOR SUBORDINATE HEADQUARTERS OVER
THE FORCES
SELECT DESIRED GRAPHICS TO CONTROL THE MAJOR
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (MSCs)
PREPARE COA STATEMENT(S) AND SKETCH(ES)
COA STATEMENT(S): COVER WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW
AND WHY IN BATTLEFIELD STRUCTURE AND COVER
PURPOSE, MAIN EFFORT OR MAIN ATTACK, SCHEME
OF MANEUVER, AND RISK
COA SKETCH(ES) INCLUDE: AVENUES OF APPROACH,
MAJOR TERRAIN FEATURES, MAJOR OBSTACLES, MSC
UNIT BOUNDARIES, ZONES OF ATTACK OR DEFENSE
SECTORS, PHASE LINES, ASSEMBLY AREAS,
STRONGPOINTS, BATTLE POSITIONS, OBJECTIVES,
ENGAGEMENT AREAS, FEBA/LD, MAIN EFFORT, AND
ALLOCATED FORCES

S+3 HR 45 MIN

BDE XO PRESENTS COAs TO ORDERS GROUP (UTILIZE
BLOWUP) AND PRIORITIZES CRITICAL ITEMS TO FOCUS ON DURING
STAFF ESTIMATES AND PREPARATION OF DECISION MATRICES

S4: IDENTIFY POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND DEFICIENCIES,
REQUIREMENTS FOR CSS, ESTIMATED ATTRITION

S1: IDENTIFY PROJECTION OF BATTLE LOSSES IN
PERSONNEL

REMAINDER OF ORDERS GROUP: DETERMINE HOW CAN BEST
SUPPORT MISSION AND REQUIREMENTS

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

ORDERS GROUP: DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT, RISK, ADVANTAGES, AND DISADVANTAGES, AND DEVELOP STAFF ESTIMATES (FM 101-5) ON COA's

S+4 HR

ORDERS GROUP DISCUSSES STAFF ESTIMATES AND DECISION MATRICES WITH BDE XO (BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH BDE CDR)

BDE XO COMPARE COAs RESULT (USE DECISION MATRIX OR LIST ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES)

S+4 HR 15 MIN

COA AND INITIAL WARGAMING BRIEF TO BDE CDR
S2: REVIEW MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COA & INTELL UPDATES
S3: REVIEW COAs
FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, CHEMA, ENG, MI, ADA, MP, CA,
PSYOPS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS, S1, S4, BSO: WHAT COAs
YOU CAN SUPPORT AND WHICH COA CAN BEST BE SUPPORTED
BDE XO: BOTTOM LINE RECOMMENDATION-HIGHLIGHT
SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH
COA, IDENTIFY BRANCHES AND SEQUELS
SUB LNOs ATTEND

S+4 HR 45 MIN

BDE CDR MAKES DECISION AND SELECTS COA AND FURTHER DEVELOPS CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

1. REVIEW MISSION & CDR'S INTENT (NOTE CHANGES)
2. PROVIDE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS INCLUDING
ACTIONS IN DEEP, CLOSE, REAR, SECURITY, AND
RESERVES
3. REFINE GENERAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER
4. CONFIRM TASK ORGANIZATION
5. SPECIFY CONTROL MEASURES
6. IDENTIFY MAIN EFFORT AND HOW TO WEIGHT IT WITH
COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE
SUPPORT ASSETS, SUPPORT EFFORT, FOLLOW AND
SUPPORT EFFORT, & RESERVE
7. SPECIFY EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR MANEUVER AND
FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENTS
8. CONFIRM PRIORITY AND EFFECTS OF FIRES
9. HIGHLIGHT CSS CONCERNS
10. NOTE COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
11. DISCUSS ACCEPTABLE RISK

S+5 HR 15 MIN

ORDERS GROUP CONDUCTS FINAL DETAILED WARGAMING (SUB LNOs ATTEND)

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

S3: WARGAMING SEQUENCE:

GATHER THE TOOLS (ENEMY AND FRIENDLY COA, ENEMY
TEMPLATE, CURRENT FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS,
1:50,000 MAP, SKETCHES)

LIST FRIENDLY FORCES (ALL ORGANIC, ASSIGNED,
ATTACHED AND OPCON UNITS AND PRIORITY OF
SUPPORT PROVIDED BY HIGHER AND ASSETS SUCH AS
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, BATTLEFIELD AIR
INTERDICTION, AND TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE)

LIST THE ASSUMPTIONS DELIVERED DURING MISSION
ANALYSIS

LIST KNOWN CRITICAL EVENTS AND DECISION POINTS
OFFENSE: DEEP OPERATIONS, PASSAGE OF LINES,
BREACHING OF MAIN OBSTACLE BELT, PENETRATIONS
OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, SEIZING THE OBJECTIVE,
REACTION OF ENEMY COUNTERATTACK FORCES, RIVER
CROSSING, USE OF RESERVES

DEFENSE: DEEP OPERATIONS, BATTLE HANDOVER,
DESTRUCTION OF FIRST ECHELON FORCES,
DESTRUCTION OF FOLLOW ON FORCES, COMMITMENT OF
COUNTERATTACK FORCES OR RESERVES

SELECT A WARGAME METHOD (AVENUE-IN-DEPTH (SLOWEST),
BELT TECHNIQUE, BOX TECHNIQUE (FASTEST))

SELECT A TECHNIQUE TO RECORD AND DISPLAY THE RESULTS
(MENTAL NOTES, NARRATIVE, WORKSHEET,
SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX)

WAR GAME THE BATTLE USING PROCESS OF
ACTION-REACTION-ATTRITION-COUNTERACTION AND
ASSESS THE RESULTS

S3: FOR EACH COA WARGAMED: MAKE REFINEMENTS OR
MODIFICATIONS TO THE COA, IDENTIFY BRANCHES, IDENTIFY
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION, IDENTIFY TASKS
TO MANEUVER UNITS, PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF BATTLE DURATION
OF EACH CRITICAL EVENT AND THE ENTIRE BATTLE, CALCULATE
FORCE RATIOS AT EACH OBJECTIVE, IDENTIFY ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES, PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF KILOMETER LOSS OR
GAIN, IDENTIFY REQUIRED USE OF OTHER COMBAT CAPABILITIES,
IDENTIFY ADDITIONAL CRITICAL EVENTS, ASSESS POTENTIAL FOR
NUCLEAR AND/OR CHEMICAL EFFECTS, PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT SUPPORT, DECEPTION AND SURPRISE,
PROVIDE INPUT TO THE DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE, DETERMINE
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PLAN FOR SEQUELS

S2: ACT AS AN ADVERSARY IN WARGAMING, IDENTIFY
REACTIONS, PROVIDE A PROJECTION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
ENEMY FORCE DEFEATED IN EACH CRITICAL EVENT AND OVERALL,
VERIFY PIR, NAIs AND TAIs, PREPARE FINAL EVENT TEMPLATE

ORDERS GROUP. INTERJECT WHERE APPROPRIATE ADVERSARY
ACTION/REACTION RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL
SPECIALITY

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

S+7 HR

ORDERS GROUP CONDUCTS DETAILED PLANNING FOR ORDER AND CONTINUES PARALLEL STAFF PLANNING WITH SUBORDINATE UNITS

BDE XO DETERMINES NEED FOR UPDATED WARNING ORDER

BDE XO ANNOUNCES ANNEXES REQUIRED FOR ORDER (ANNEX A, B, C, D, E, V MANDATORY) (TO BE DETERMINED: F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC)

BRIGADE TARGETING CELL REFINES PRIORITY TARGETS, HIGH PAYOFF TARGETS, COMMANDER'S ATTACK CRITERIA, AND TAI's

S2 CONTINUE THREAT INTEGRATION WITH FINAL EVENT TEMPLATE AND DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE + OPERATIONS ESTIMATE IN GRAPHIC FORM + TAI's + DECISION POINTS (DPs)) BASED ON FRIENDLY COA SELECTED

BDE XO CONTACT DIVISION HEADQUARTERS TO DETERMINE REQUIREMENT FOR BRIEF BACK TO DIV CDR, IF REQUIRED THE FORMAT FOR BRIEF IS:

1. RESULTS OF MISSION ANALYSIS
(SPEC/IMP TASKS) (S3 / BDE CDR)
2. TASK ORGANIZATION (S3 / BDE CDR)
3. MISSION (TASK AND PURPOSE) (S3 / BDE CDR)
4. COMMANDERS INTENT (BDE CDR)
5. SEVEN BATTLEFIELD OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS:
 - A. INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE (S2)
 - B. MANEUVER (S3)
 - C. FIRE SUPPORT (FSO)
 - D. MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY, NBC (ENG, CHEMO)
 - E. ADA/ARMY AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT (S3 AIR / ADA LNO / AVN LNO)
 - F. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (S4 / S1)
 - G. COMMAND, CONTROL, & COMMUNICATIONS (BSO/S3)
6. RISKS BRIGADE WILL HAVE TO TAKE
7. CONFIRMATION OF THE DIVISION AND FLANK ROLES
8. REQUIREMENTS FROM HIGHER TO FACILITATE SUCCESS
9. ISSUES (ORDERS GROUP - REVIEW RFIs)

S3 & S2 DISCUSS COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PLAN AND RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (R&S) PLAN, CONFIRM SCHEME OF RECONNAISSANCE, ASSIGNMENT OF DPs, NAI's, R&S OVERLAY

S+7 HR 30 MIN

SET UP BRIEFING AREA (S3 PLANS)

BRIEF BACK DIV CDR (IF MANDATED)

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

S+7 HR 45 MIN

ORDERS GROUP REVIEW OVERLAYS WITH S3 / BDE XO TO AVOID FRATRICIDE (ALL OVERLAYS TO INCLUDE MANEUVER GRAPHICS, OBSTACLES/MINES + FA TARGETS + ENEMY AAs + FRIENDLY POSITIONS + FIELD ARTILLERY PLATOON / BATTERY LOCATIONS + MI ASSETS + R&S + ADA LOCATIONS + BRIGADE SUPPORT AREA (BSA), AND OTHER ATTACHMENT POSITIONS ARE OVERLAYED TO IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES)

S+8 HR 30 MIN

ORDERS GROUP BRIEFS DRAFT ORDER TO BDE CDR / BDE XO

BDE CDR PROVIDES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON ORDER IF NEEDED

S+9 HR 30 MIN

S3 BRIEFS EXECUTION MATRIX TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

S+10 HR

BDE XO RECEIVES AND REVIEWS ORDER AND ANNEXES AND OVERLAYS

ORDERS GROUP REPRODUCES FINAL COPIES OF ORDER/OVERLAYS UPON APPROVAL OF BDE XO

S+11 HR

ORDERS GROUP PROVIDE FINAL COPIES OF ORDER/OVERLAYS TO S3 PLANS FOR COLLATION

SET UP BRIEFING AREA FOR BRIGADE OPERATIONS ORDER (S3 PLANS SECTION)

S+12 HR

ISSUE ORDER (AREA TO BE BRIEFED AND BRIEFING SEQUENCE)

1. AO, T/O, MISSION: XO (PUT ON CHART)
2. COMMANDERS INTENT: BDE CDR (PUT ON CHART)
3. ENEMY SITUATION: S2
4. FRIENDLY SITUATION: S3
5. MANEUVER: S3
 - A. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATIONS
 - B. TASKS TO MANEUVER UNITS
 - C. KEY COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
6. PERTINENT HIGHLIGHTS OF PARAGRAPHS 3, 4, AND 5 AND ANNEXES: COMBAT MULTIPLIER BRIEFING FSO, ALO, AVN LNO, CHEMO, ENG, MI, ADA, MP, CA, PSYOPS, OTHER ATTACHMENTS

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

ANNEXES:

- *ANNEX A: TASK ORGANIZATION (S3)
- *ANNEX B: INTELLIGENCE (S2)
- *ANNEX C: OPERATIONS OVERLAY (S3)
- *ANNEX D: FIRE SUPPORT (FSO)
- ANNEX E: SERVICE AND SUPPORT (S4)
- ANNEX F: CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS (CA)
- ANNEX G: ENGINEER (ENG)
- ANNEX H: AIR DEFENSE (ADA)
- ANNEX I: ARMY AVIATION (S3 AIR)
- ANNEX J: AIRSPACE UTILIZATION (AVN LNO)
- ANNEX K: COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS (BSO)
- ANNEX L: REAR OPERATIONS (S4)
- ANNEX M: ELECTRONIC WARFARE (S3)
- ANNEX N: DECEPTION (S3)
- ANNEX O: BARRIER AND DENIAL (ENG)
- ANNEX P: COUNTERATTACK PLAN (S3)
- ANNEX Q: AIR MOVEMENT (S3/AIR)
- ANNEX R: GROUND MOVEMENT (S4)
- ANNEX S: CROSSING PLANS (ENG)
- ANNEX T: OPERATIONS SECURITY (S3)
- ANNEX U: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS)
- *ANNEX V: SAFETY (S1)
- ANNEX W: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (S1)
- ANNEX X: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (CHEMO)
- ANNEX Y: DISTRIBUTION (S3)
- ANNEX Z: REPORTS (ALL)
- ANNEX AA: AIRMOBILE / AIR ASSAULT (AIR)
- ANNEX BB: CONTINGENCY MISSION (S3)
- ANNEX CC: RELIGIOUS SUPPORT (CHAP)
- * MANDATORY FOR ALL OPERATIONS
- 7. SERVICE SUPPORT: S1 / S4
- 8. COMMAND & SIGNAL: BSO
- 9. SOLDIER CONCERNS: BDE CSM
- 10. CLOSING COMMENTS: BDE CDR

S+13 HR

ORDERS GROUP SUPERVISES EXECUTION BY SUBORDINATE
UNITS AND ANSWERS ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR
INFORMATION

S+13 HR 30 MIN

BACK BRIEF TO BDE CDR BY BATTALION COMMANDERS
(INFANTRY, ARMOR, ARTILLERY, FORWARD SUPPORT
BATTALION, AND AVIATION) REFERENCE UNIT'S MISSION,
TASKS AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE BDE CDR'S
INTENT (ORDER OF BRIEF: MAIN EFFORT, SUPPORTING
EFFORT, FOLLOW AND SUPPORT, RESERVE) BDE XO, S1,
S2, S3, S4, AND FSO SHOULD BE PRESENT FOR COMMENTS

Appendix D: Brigade 12 Hour Planning Timeline (continued)

S+15 HR

ORDERS GROUP SUBMIT OVERLAYS FOR TERRAIN MANAGEMENT
BOARD TO CURRENT OPERATIONS

TBD

STAFF, LOGISTIC, AND TOC REHEARSALS

TBD

BRIEF BACK TO BDE CDR

TBD

BRIGADE REHEARSAL

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